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Abstract: According to recent accounts of so called “liturgical 
anthropology,” human beings are ritual creatures shaped more by what 
they feel than what they think. This is because the liturgies that make up 
our daily lives orient our desires towards certain goals and visions of the 
good life. We seek to expand this vision of liturgical anthropology by 
offering a critique of a predominantly affective vision of human 
development in which liturgy shapes primarily what we love. Drawing 
insights from developmental psychology, we argue that affect and 
cognition are intertwined throughout development, each reinforcing the 
other. Instead of attempting to artificially separate cognition and affect, 
then, we offer a vision of liturgical anthropology that is holistic, paying 
attention to the ways in which both our desires and beliefs are shaped by 
participation in liturgies, whether these be religious or otherwise. Finally, 
we argue that the psychological concept of “joint attention” can provide a 
helpful focal point for establishing why liturgy and ritual is so formative 
for human development. 
 
Keywords: Liturgy, Anthropology, Developmental psychology, 
Cognition, Affect 
 
1. Ritual and Anthropology1 
  
Human beings are ritual creatures. From an early age, we understand the world 
through repetitive habits and practices. Mundane activities, like eating and 
sleeping, involve regularly repeated routines, and rituals of family storytelling 
 
1 We would like to thank the editors, Kutter Callaway and Oliver Crisp, along with two 
anonymous referees for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.  





and reminiscing shape our sense of identity and memory. This ritualized 
development is also inherently social in nature; it is through engagement with 
caregivers and parents that we learn how to engage properly in ritualized action. 
As developmental psychologists are keen to remind us, without interaction we 
cannot properly realize our capacities to think, to feel, or to act in the world.2 
The importance of ritual for understanding what it is to be human has not 
gone unnoticed by theologians either. In his recent work on the rituals of Hebrew 
Scripture, Dru Johnson has outlined the importance of ritual participation in 
coming to understand ourselves, the world and its creator. Summarizing his 
thesis, Johnson writes, “Ritual participation forms us to recognize and then 
discern as one of its central functions. Because humans are ritualized creatures, 
we will always have embodied understanding of the world even where our 
understanding appears to be solely verbal” (2016, 5). According to James K.A. 
Smith (2009)—who has developed one of the most influential accounts of 
liturgical anthropology—the reason rituals and liturgies are so formative to us is 
because human beings are primarily desiring creatures. Smith argues that rituals 
are a vital means by which our desires are shaped, even if we are not aware of 
the ways in which they do so.  
Johnson’s and Smith’s accounts find resonance with many of the ways the 
psychological sciences describe ritual formation.3 And there are clearly points of 
contact between the psychological sciences and the topics of theological 
anthropology. Yet, we think that the discussion stands to benefit from a more in–
depth dialogue between these two disciplines. For as we show, many of the 
presuppositions made by theological approaches to ritual oversimplify, and 
sometimes contradict, the insights found in psychological sciences. More 
specifically, developmental psychological research presents a complex and 
intertwined account of the relationship between cognition and affect, 
problematizing a liturgical anthropology rooted only in desire. Furthermore, 
developmental psychology has demonstrated the profoundly social origins of 
human cognition (Rogoff et al. 1995, Tomasello 2019; Vygotsky 1978).  
While we agree with Smith that human beings are undoubtedly shaped by the 
practices they engage with from a very young age, we argue that it is simplistic 
to think that these practices are primarily desire orientated, and problematic not 
to emphasise the social origins of these practices. Whereas Smith thinks rituals 
are important because they shape our desires, instead, we argue that a liturgical 
anthropology requires a complex account of human formation; we are shaped 
cognitively (implicitly and explicitly), affectively, and bodily through 
 
2 Whilst the specifics of leading theoretical accounts differ, there is widespread agreement 
regarding the crucial role of social interaction in development. See: Hobson (2004); Reddy (2008); 
Tomasello (2019). 
3 See, for example, a recent collection of papers on ritual: Legare and Nielsen (2020).  




participation in liturgical practices that are social in origin. Finally, we conclude 
by proposing an alternative focus for future work in this area, namely, to consider 
the role of joint attention in liturgy. It is our contention that liturgies are so 
formative not merely because they shape our desire (per Smith) but because they 
direct the focus and quality of our attention in important ways.  
First, a caveat concerning methodology and a second on terminology. 
Throughout the article, we seek to do “psychology–engaged” theology, showing 
the insights that can be gained by drawing upon the empirical findings 
psychologists have generated, and considering psychological perspectives on 
existing theological questions.4 But it is important to acknowledge that our 
insights here are drawn from a particular tradition in psychology; that which can 
be broadly termed a sociocultural approach. This perspective can be found in the 
influential works of Vygotsky (1978), Bruner (1986, 1990) and Rogoff (Rogoff et 
al. 1995), and more recently is championed by psychologists such as Tomasello 
(2019). Broadly speaking, it refers to those views that give a central role to social 
and cultural influences on human development. We adopt this viewpoint as we 
argue that it provides the most promising theoretical framework in light of the 
current best available evidence that psychologists have identified. Psychology 
and the cognitive sciences consist of a large variety of theories and disciplines 
with no overarching unifying framework; it is thus not a “mature science” in the 
sense used by Varela and colleagues (2017). On our view, to be psychology–
engaged requires accepting that, at present, there can never be a single 
“Psychology” with which to engage; thus, it is necessary to adopt a particular 
theoretical starting point from which to build a psychology–engaged argument.  
Secondly, we use the terms “practice”, “ritual”, and “liturgy” throughout. 
There is no uncontentious way to use these terms, particularly when attempting 
interdisciplinary engagement. We opt to use them, broadly following their usage 
in the psychological sciences, as increasingly specific terms capturing related 
concepts. “Practices” are any kind of repeated, defined sequences of bodily 
activity,5 while “rituals” are practices as used in symbolic, culturally meaningful 
ways that are at least partly non–instrumental; either the ritual has no apparent 
practical effect, or it is not clear how the ritual achieves its stated aim.6 Rituals are 
also conducted with the goal of generating various cognitive and affective 
 
4 See Perry and Leidenhag (2021).  
5 For an example of this usage, see Racine and Carpendale (2007). 
6 Psychologists and cognitive anthropologists use the term “goal demotion” to describe cases 
where participants are unaware of why they and/or others are required to act in a certain manner, 
and use “causal opacity” to describe cases in which participants cannot articulate the mechanism 
by which a ritual achieves its purported effects; see Kapitány and Nielsen (2017). Our definition 
of ritual here draws primarily from Kapitány, Kavanagh, and Whitehouse (2020). 





responses in participants.7 Finally, we use “liturgy” to refer to the format of 
specifically religious rituals.8 However, the work with which we engage will not 
always use these terms in the same manner, and thus we will try to be clear on 
the sense in which each term is used. 
 
1.1 Homo Liturgicus: Smith’s Anthropology of Desire 
 
Let us begin by considering one of the most influential discussions of liturgical 
anthropology in the theological literature. James K.A. Smith, in his ambitious and 
wide–ranging “cultural liturgies” series, outlines a vision of what it is to be 
human, which thinks of human beings as primarily desiring creatures. For Smith, 
in contrast to what he takes to be a dominant view in Western philosophy and 
theology, human beings are not fundamentally thinkers, but lovers. Our desires, 
he thinks, are shaped by the practices we participate in, whether that be our 
shopping habits, or the liturgies of religious worship. Hence, Smith thinks, 
human beings are homo liturgicus; creatures shaped by desire–orientated 
practices, which aim to inculcate competing visions of the good life.   
The most important insight from Smith’s work, as we see it, is to notice that 
understanding the propositional content of liturgy is not sufficient for 
understanding how liturgy shapes us. Consider an example from the Danish 
philosopher, Søren Kierkegaard (1846/1992). Kierkegaard claims that to 
understand the concept of gratitude is not to understand what it is to be grateful. 
For instance, Kierkegaard imagines, hearing the words in a sermon: “You should 
be grateful to God each day,” understanding the semantic content, and still 
lacking an understanding of what it means be grateful. What is needed, he thinks, 
is that gratitude is lived out, reflected upon by the individual, and not merely 
that the propositions are understood. This sentiment seems to be at the heart of 
Smith’s reflections on liturgy; the best way to become grateful, Smith might say, 
is not to think carefully about gratitude, but to participate in practices which 
inculcate this gratitude in one’s life.9 For instance, one might use liturgies which 
express gratitude to God, spend time listing the things one is grateful for, always 
remember to send thank–you cards to relatives after receiving gifts, and so on. 
 
7 See Whitehouse and Lanman (2014); Kapitány, Kavanagh and Whitehouse (2020). 
8 As an anonymous reviewer helpfully highlights, there are transformations between these 
different levels, with practices becoming rituals and rituals taking on religious significance and 
thus becoming liturgies. Moreover, whilst practices can involve the activity of individuals or 
dyads, liturgies typically involve larger communities. Whilst we go on to discuss the role of 
sociality in practices, rituals, and liturgy, we put to one side the issue of precisely how these 
processes of transformation might occur. 
9 Indeed, this insight is shown by empirical psychology, which shows that regularly writing 
down reasons to be grateful in a journal has advantages over just thinking about reasons to be 
grateful (see Emmons and Stern 2013). 




These practices do not primarily shape our beliefs about gratitude, Smith thinks, 
but they orient our desires. Eventually, much like learning how to drive a car, 
being grateful will come as second nature to us.  
Smith’s account of being human is best understood in contrast; he aims to 
dismantle anthropologies that are primarily “cognitivist” or “rationalist,” 
namely, those who think that the human is a fundamentally thinking thing or a 
fundamentally believing thing. Such ways of conceiving of human nature, Smith 
thinks, are overly reductionist, resulting in a “very disembodied, individualistic 
picture of the human person” (2009, 45). The problem, he argues, is not that 
cognition is unimportant, but that views that emphasise cognition over and 
above emotion or affect “are focused on only a slice of being human and so tend 
to be blind to other, more significant factors that constitute human identity. 
Instead, they take the slice to be the whole and thus absolutize just one aspect of 
the human person.” (2009, 46).  
Thus, Smith proposes an anthropology rooted not in cognition, but in desire. 
In his own words, this model “sees humans as most fundamentally oriented and 
identified by love” (2009, 46). According to this desire–oriented model,  
 
the way we inhabit the world is not primarily as thinkers, or even believers, but 
as more affective, embodied creatures who make our way in the world more by 
feeling our way around it. …One might say that in our everyday, mundane 
being–in–the–world, we don’t lead with our head, so to speak; we lead out with 
our heart and our hands. (2009, 47)  
 
This desire–oriented account is supposed to emphasize the importance of 
intentionality in all ritualized behavior. This is not to suggest that human beings 
always consciously intend an aim of some sort, rather, Smith has in mind a kind 
of “noncognitive and prereflective” (2009, 50) intentionality. What this amounts 
to, it would appear, is a kind of teleological claim; human action is always 
directed towards some good or goods. The implications of this account are far–
reaching. Indeed, Smith thinks that his model provides an account of what a 
human being is, namely “a lover—a creature whose orientation and form of life 
is most primordially shaped by what one loves as ultimate, which constitutes an 
affective, gut–like orientation to the world that is prior to reflection and even 
eludes conceptual articulation” (2009, 51).  
It is against the backdrop of this desire–orientated anthropology that Smith 
unpacks the notion of the homo liturgicus. For the telos of our desires is, 
unsurprisingly, not something that is decided intellectually through conscious 
reflection, but through “rituals, routines, and exercises…[which] train your 
adaptive unconscious” (2009, 58). Thus, added to the model of human beings as 
essentially those who love, Smith adds the qualification “we are selves who are 





our bodies; thus the training of desire requires bodily practices in which a 
particular telos is embedded” (2009, 62). Summing this up, he writes:   
 
Human persons are intentional creatures whose fundamental way of 
“intending” the world is love or desire. This love or desire—which is 
unconscious or noncognitive—is always aimed at some vision of the good life, 
some particular articulation of the kingdom. What primes us to be so oriented—
and act accordingly—is a set of habits or dispositions that are formed in us 
through affective, bodily means, especially bodily practices, routines, or rituals 
that grab hold of our hearts through our imagination, which is closely linked to 
our bodily senses. (2009, 62) 
 
If human beings are primarily desire oriented, ritual creatures—homo liturgicus—
then our religious practices must reflect this; worship is something that 
“Christians do” (2009, 64). Liturgy which aims only at changing the mind (e.g. 
through a persuasive sermon), but doesn’t engage the body or the unconscious 
through ritualized movement and repetition, for instance, will not engage the 
fundamental part of the person, but only the cognitive slice of that person. This 
much is shown compellingly by Kierkegaard’s reflections on gratitude. Those 
engaged in Christian education and formation must wrestle with the fact that 
Christian liturgy competes for a person’s telos with the liturgies of culture, 
whether they be goals of nationalism, capitalism, or some political ideology. 
Thus, we should pay attention not just to what we say we worship, but how we 
worship. The clothes we wear, the buildings we worship in, the bodily gestures 
involved in liturgy—these all shape the way in which our desires are shaped.  
 
1.2 Cognition and Affect in Smith’s Anthropology  
 
It seems pertinent to ask, given that we attempt to move towards a 
psychologically–engaged account of liturgical anthropology, what the 
relationship between cognition and affect is on Smith’s model. Smith repeatedly 
claims that affective processes are more fundamental to human functioning than 
cognitive processes, which have a secondary role. But given the repeated 
insistence that this model is “non–reductive,” it is difficult to establish what the 
precise relationship is between human cognition, affect, and ritual on Smith’s 
account. Instead, we are offered suggestive language—his model “shifts the 
center of gravity of human identity away from a fixation on thinking, ideas, and 
doctrines and locates it lower, at [sic] it were, in the region of our affective, 
nonconscious operations” (2009, 63). Such claims, while evocative, are hard to 
unravel from a psychological perspective, even though psychologically loaded 
terminology (e.g. “nonconscious”) is employed.  
 




What seems clear—especially given Smith’s claims about the fundamentality 
of desire, rather than cognition—is that the account thinks of human beings as 
affective creatures necessarily (or fundamentally), and cognition merely provides 
an input to this affective, noncognitive core of a human person. This much seems 




We are what we love, Smith thinks.10 This is an anthropological claim about what 
is fundamental to the identity of human beings. All knowledge, desire and 
motivation are rooted in an affective core on this picture. It is not that cognition 
drops out entirely, but that it must be grounded in affect, or else we end up with 
the Cartesian thinking I at the center of anthropology, Smith thinks. Consider an 
example to help show why. In a revealing passage, Smith considers how 
engaging with liturgy alongside young children and the cognitively disabled 
might tell us about the way it shapes us as human beings:  
 
As I’ve been articulating this, I have had two special cases in my mind: children 
and mentally challenged adults. Both have limited capacities for grasping 
theological concepts or the sorts of theoretical formulations that characterize 
even worldview–talk. Their ability to process the sorts of abstractions that 
characterize even beliefs is limited, either temporarily (in the case of children) or 
 
10 This is the title to his accessible–level summary of the Cultural Liturgies series (2016).  





chronically (in the case of the mentally handicapped). Does that mean that they 
cannot achieve fullness in Christ? Do the limits of their cognitive abilities impair 
the hope of their “growing up” into Christ (Eph. 4:15)? Does their inability to 
traffic in concepts preclude them from being educated? Not according to the 
anthropology I have sketched above; rather, because we are more fundamentally 
creatures of love and desire than knowledge. (2009, 136)  
 
An appeal to those with limited cognitive capacities is supposed to show that we 
cannot be content with a “cognition first” model. And we wish to affirm Smith’s 
concerns for debunking an overly “cognitive” approach to liturgy, and to stress 
that liturgy is forming for all its participants, not just mentally typical adults. But 
the conclusions for anthropology do not follow from the premises here.  
Why suppose that the relationship between cognition and affect operates as 
such? As we argue shortly, it is not so easy to simplify the relationship between 
cognition and affect from a psychological perspective, such that we can neatly 
point to the operations of these parts of the human person. Indeed, as we look at 
how cognition and affect develop in early infancy, we will present a mutually 
reinforcing relationship, rather than one taking priority over the other. We do not 
need to think that affect is fundamental or primary in order to show that liturgy 
forms us in ways that do not involve learning facts and doctrines. As we will go 
on to show, our cognition as well as our affect is shaped implicitly and 
subconsciously through ritual participation just as our affect is. Even in the very 
early days of infancy, cognitive development is occurring. And so, a simplistic 
picture in which liturgy is said to shape us only, or primarily, as creatures of 
desire will not suffice. 
Perhaps, it will be argued, we are merely splitting hairs, and that Smith is 
using “noncognitive” in a loose and non–scientific sense. While it is true that 
there may be good reasons to oversimplify psychological frameworks to enforce 
a conclusion, the effects of this oversimplification downstream, so to speak, are 
significant. If liturgical practices are seen to be primarily desire shaping and only 
ever secondarily belief shaping, then Smith’s account of liturgical anthropology 
is potentially as problematic as the position he critiques. In the final two sections, 
we will show that a holistic approach is needed to explain the formative effects 
of liturgy. While it is important to see here that while Smith is not offering a 
psychologically–informed account of anthropology, he is using psychologically 
charged vocabulary such as “affect” and “cognition.” And so, a nuanced 
discussion about liturgy and formation cannot proceed without consideration of 
the psychological literature.  
To be clear: we are not arguing that a theological anthropology which sees love 
at the centre of human existence can be scientifically falsified. In fact, the 
psychological perspective we develop in this paper could easily affirm such an 
anthropology; it would seem strange to think that love is primarily affective 




rather than cognitive given how complexly these states interact. Intuitively, 
although we will not argue for it here, an anthropology makes more sense on our 
holistic account than on Smith’s affect–first account. Thus, while we think Smith 
is successful in showing that what we believe is not as important as some 
traditions maintain, a psychologically–informed approach to liturgical 
anthropology has more scope to explain why this is the case than an 
anthropology that thinks of affect as our primary driving force.  
 
2. Development and Psychological Holism  
 
A better starting point for thinking about liturgical anthropology from a 
psychological perspective, we think, is to examine the critical role of development 
in the process of ritual learning. Looking at the development of cognition and 
affect in infancy can help shed light on how ritual participation shapes the way 
we think and feel in adulthood. We explore three insights which can help provide 
what we call a “psychologically holistic” account of liturgy and formation, which 
we summarize in the next section.  
First, developmental psychology underscores the unity of affect, cognition, 
and action in human experience; while each can be contemplated in abstraction 
from the other, in lived experience they are always aspects of an interdependent 
whole (Bruner 1986). The question of which aspect is primary or fundamental is 
not a well–formed question from a psychological perspective. Secondly, a 
developmental perspective highlights the need for a nuanced approach to 
“cognition,” which recognizes that cognition involves processes that are implicit 
(non–propositional) as well as explicit (propositional) (Gómez et al. 2017). 
Finally, we argue that an appreciation of development provides insight into the 
developmental and evolutionary origins of explicit cognition. It has been widely 
argued that explicit cognitive processes find their origin in social engagement, 
even from divergent theoretical perspectives (Heyes and Frith 2014; Hutto 2008; 
Mercier and Sperber 2011; O’Madagain and Tomasello 2019). And thus, we have 
a helpful paradigm for thinking about how liturgical practices shape our minds 
(e.g., cognitively and affectively, implicitly and explicitly), the contexts and 
situations in which this development takes place (e.g., in social interaction and 
shared practices), and indeed the very central place of development in providing 
an understanding of human psychology and behavior. In what follows, we 
unpack these insights in more detail.  
 
2.1 The Unity of Cognition, Affect and Action 
 
The first issue we address is the relation between cognition and affect. These 
terms are notoriously difficult to define and are used inconsistently in the 





psychology literature.11 However, for our purposes it suffices to use a broad 
definition to allow us to highlight the salient issues we are aiming to address.12 
Cognition is classically defined as those processes used by an agent to organize 
incoming information and using this information to plan and direct behavior 
(Aizawa 2015). We are employing cognitive resources when we compare 
multiple streams of incoming information, suppress unneeded information, 
switch between tasks and draw upon previously stored information (Schmeichel 
and Tang 2015). For example, to cook a meal we may need to remember the 
recipe, plan in what order we prepare the ingredients, track the temperature of 
the pan while chopping the onions, all while ignoring the phone ringing. 
Behavior controlled by cognitive processes is considered intelligent, in that it 
involves planned and coordinated action as opposed to reflexive, automatic 
responses.13 
In defining affect, we follow a broadly constructionist approach in treating 
affect (or “core affect” (Russel and Barrett 1999), as the feelings arising in the 
body that are consistently present to us. They can be felt more or less strongly, 
and more or less positively. When we try and understand or communicate about 
specific episodes involving these feelings, we conceptualize them in the form of 
emotions (Hoemann and Feldman Barrett 2019). For example, if we have a 
conversation, our inner affective state will constantly fluctuate, remaining low–
level and slightly positive as we engage in small talk, being experienced as 
strongly negative as someone says something rude. These fluctuations may need 
to be conceptualized in order to be articulated, leading to us interpreting these 
feelings as “I am angry she said that” or “I am worried by that statement.” 
It has been argued that cognition and affect only make sense in relation to 
some kind of situated action involving sensorimotor (bodily) activity; cognition 
is primarily a means of deciding how to act using the body, and affective patterns 
arise in response to the environment and the need to act within that environment 
(Bruner 1986). Critiquing approaches that split cognition, affect and sensorimotor 




11 See discussions in Adams and Garrison (2013); Russel and Barrett (1999). 
12 See Allen, 2017, for an argument in favor of this approach. 
13 There is a large and longstanding debate over how to define cognition. See Aizawa and 
Adams (2008); Adams and Garrison (2013). On whether cognition is embodied, see Aizawa 
(2015); Varela et al. (2017). Whilst our perspective bears similarity to some arguments from 
embodied cognition theorists regarding the interdependence of cognition and action, we avoid 
entering specific conceptual disputes in this domain as they are not relevant to our overarching 
argument. 
14 Bruner uses the term “action” rather than sensorimotor or bodily activity, but his intended 
meaning is similar. 




It seems far more useful to recognize at the start that all three terms represent 
abstractions, abstractions that have a high theoretical cost. The price we pay for 
such abstractions in the end is to lose sight of their structural interdependence. 
At whatever level we look, however detailed the analysis, the three are 
constituents of a unified whole. To isolate each is like studying the planes of a 
crystal separately, losing sight of the crystal that gives them being. (Bruner 1986, 
118) 
 
While Bruner elsewhere accepts that it can be useful to study each in isolation 
(and that it may be practically expedient to do so), his core claim is that, however 
we conceive of cognition, affect, and sensorimotor activity, we must recognize 
that they are fundamentally interdependent.15 What Bruner offers is a 
psychologically holistic approach. This approach emphasizes that the three are 
only separable when considered in the abstract. Treating each independently and 
only building theoretical bridges between them after constructing domain–
specific theories will create insoluble theoretical issues.16  
Bruner’s claim is explicitly developmental. He highlights that the tendency to 
split the three domains has a chronological dimension, with cognition 
purportedly emerging later in ontogeny than affect and action. However (as we 
explore in more detail below), cognition is not the “late bloomer” of the three. In 
fact, the importance of recognizing the unity of cognition, affect, and 
sensorimotor activity is strikingly apparent in the study of infant development. 
The developmental literature on infant social development provides convincing 
evidence in support of Bruner’s thesis concerning the inseparability of affect and 
cognition.   
First, starting early in the first year, we see that infants engage in responsive, 
reciprocal “proto–conversations” (Bateson 1975), in which attention and positive 
affect are shared between infant and caregiver. These engagements are so named 
as they exhibit features of timing, coordination, and contingency that are 
characteristic of a conversation, and have been shown to be the basis of later more 
complex communicative exchanges (Csibra 2010). When a caregiver completely 
ceases to respond (as in the “Still Face” paradigm (Tronick et al. 1978)), infants 
will employ a range of methods in order to resume the interaction, such as 
breaking attention away and back, and vocalizing loudly (Adamson and Frick 
 
15 It is important to note the three–part division here is not of central importance; one could 
opt to split affect into “emotion” and “motivation,” or, as we go on to do, subdivide cognition 
into “implicit” and “explicit” cognition. The nature of the split is not as important as the ultimate 
unity and interdependence of any abstractly divided components. 
16 In recent years, a number of theorists have made similar claims regarding the unity of 
psychological processes (see Gray 2004; Schmeichel and Tang 2015) with some arguing that 
cognition and affect are ultimately indistinguishable (see Duncan and Barrett 2007; Hoemann and 
Barrett 2019; Pessoa 2008). 





2003). These behaviors are not only involved in developing socio–cognitive 
understanding, but also are implicated in the development of socio–emotional 
attachments (Ainsworth et al. 1978; Dunst and Kassow 2008; Meins 1997). To 
understand these early engagements, both the cognitive (control, timing, and 
coordination) and affective (motivation to seek interaction, pleasure gained from 
interacting) each need to be appreciated. 
Secondly, towards the end of the first year, infants go beyond “dyadic” 
engagement solely between persons, and begin to engage in what have been 
termed “triadic” engagements, involving two persons attending to some object 
or event of interest (Tomasello 1995). It has been repeatedly argued that such 
engagements cannot be understood in solely informational terms, whereby this 
change is purely a shift in cognitive resources such that infants can process 
objects and persons simultaneously. Rather, infants’ attention sharing is an 
experience charged with positive affect for infant and caregiver alike (Carpenter 
and Liebal 2011; Hobson 2005; Leavens et al. 2014). Infants share attention and 
interest at least in part because of the pleasure it brings them to do so. Efforts to 
distinguish “mere” looking from looking to communicate about some target 
frequently involve a concurrent behavior such as a smile or vocalization (Jones 
and Hong 2001; Venezia et al. 2004). Put simply, to make sense of early attention 
sharing, it is necessary to recognize the role of both the cognitive dimension 
(namely, the attentional and memory resources to keep track of both a person 
and an object), as well as the affective dimension (evidenced by a smiling 
expression, for instance).  
Thirdly, while we have focused so far on cognitive and affective processes, 
research on the impact of sensorimotor developments in infancy also reveal that, 
as one recent review put it, “Motor development and psychological development 
are fundamentally related” (Adolph and Hoch 2019, 141). In other words, the 
seemingly straightforward theoretical divide between mental and bodily 
development is more complex from a developmental perspective. For example, 
the onset of self–locomotion towards the end of the first year has cascading 
developmental consequences for infants, with some going so far as to claim it 
heralds the “psychological birth” of the infant.17 Self–locomotion has been linked 
to improvements in cognitive abilities such as understanding of causal relations, 
working memory and intention understanding (Anderson et al. 2013; Brandone 
2015; though see Brandone et al. 2020). The ability to move oneself also changes 
the kinds of social situations that infants encounter. Some have argued that it 
increases the number of situations in which caregiver and infant will be required 
to communicate at a distance (Campos et al. 2000). This sort of communication 
 
17 We take this claim from Anderson and colleagues’ (2013) reading of Mahler and colleagues 
(1975).  




may be positive, but it may be in response to the new kinds of potentially 
dangerous situations encountered by a locomoting infant, such as encountering 
a high cliff edge or steep slope (Sorce et al. 1985). These new and uncertain 
situations require the infant to apply their cognitive, affective, and sensorimotor 
resources in new ways, whether by assessing if they are capable of descending 
alone (Adolph 1995) or seeking information or emotional support from a 
caregiver (Ehli et al. 2020).18  
The findings of research into infant social development are undoubtedly 
complex, but demonstrate that cognition, affect, and action are intertwined and 
interdependent domains. Early social interactions involve an interplay of 
cognitive and affective processes, while sensorimotor developments have 
cascading consequences on infant social and psychological development. 
 
2.2 Implicit and Explicit Cognition 
 
The second issue highlighted by a developmental perspective is the nature of 
cognitive processes. In a nutshell, the point is this: to emphasize cognition in 
liturgical development is not to talk only of conscious or explicit cognitive 
processes.  
Recall that on our broad definition, cognition refers to processes involved in 
organizing information and using this information to plan and direct behavior. 
What is not part of this definition is any requirement that cognitive processes 
need have propositional content, of the kind enabled by language. The work of 
developmental and comparative (across species) psychologists has shown that 
pre– and non–linguistic beings behave in ways that indicate that there are 
coordinating and planning processes involved (Adams and Garrison 2013; 
Gómez et al. 2017).  
Developmental psychologists have long recognized that pre–linguistic infants 
behave in intelligent, purposive ways. Perhaps the most famous exponent of this 
view is Jean Piaget, whose account of “sensorimotor intelligence” has been 
enormously influential in helping psychologists appreciate that infants’ behavior 
is not random and disorganized but controlled and intentional (Piaget 1952). 
Even simple behaviors like reaching towards an object or turning and visually 
 
18 A further argument for this view draws upon evidence of dissociations between infants’ 
predictions and actions. For example, there can be a mismatch between visual attention and 
reaching behavior when infants track an object following an irregular, non–linear trajectory that 
moves within their reach (von Hoftsen et al. 1998). This implies that multiple separate systems 
are involved in processing incoming perceptual information and subsequently acting on this 
information. If multiple systems are implicated in prediction and action, it becomes more difficult 
to claim that any one system is primary or basic. With thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this 
point. 





attending to a target involve intentional, goal directed coordination of multiple 
movements, with careful timing and responsive corrective maneuvers 
(Delafield–Butt and Trevarthen 2015). 
Recently, new experimental methods have found ways to assess implicit forms 
of understanding demonstrated by infants in their first year. Novel 
methodologies have identified that infants reliably look longer at surprising or 
unexpected events and will look to locations where they predict an expected 
event (Baillargeon et al., 1985; Johnson et al. 1991). These methods have 
subsequently been leveraged to identify that infants have an implicit, “naïve” 
grasp of physics and psychology. In the physical domain, infants expect 
inanimate objects to behave in consistent ways, such as being solid (Baillargeon 
et al., 1985) and being affected by gravity (Kim and Spelke 1992).  In the social 
domain, infants understand agents’ goal–directed and referential actions (Csibra 
2003), and prefer agents that are helpful over those that hinder others (Hamlin, 
Wynn and Bloom 2007).  
Similarly, comparative psychologists have provided overwhelming evidence 
that, despite lacking language, animals behave in intelligent ways that indicate a 
capacity for cognition. Chimpanzees act according to others’ knowledge and 
beliefs (Call et al. 2004; Hare, Call and Tomasello 2001; Krupenye et al. 2016), and 
fashion tools that they can use to solve tasks (Boesch and Boesch 1990; Whiten, 
Horner and De Waal 2005). Corvids understand causality, manufacture tools and 
engage in prospective behaviors (Emery and Clayton 2004). Further work in 
animal cognition has looked at the cognitive abilities of a range of taxonomically 
diverse creatures, from cetaceans (Marino et al. 2007) to elephants (Byrne, Bates, 
and Moss 2009) to bees (Chittka 2017). 
As a consequence of such research, it is common to draw a distinction between 
implicit and explicit cognitive processes (Kahnemann 2011; Gómez et al. 2017).19 
Broadly speaking, explicit cognitive processes are of the kind that have 
propositional content and can be expressed using language. In contrast, implicit 
cognitive processes are those that cannot be expressed in propositional terms.20 
There is an important theoretical role for processes that are genuinely “thinking” 
processes yet are not explicit, or forms of knowledge that are implicit. 
 
19 In a similar vein, discussions in philosophy of mind have highlighted the role of “tacit 
knowledge” (Davies 2015) and the distinction between “knowledge that” and “knowledge how” 
(Stanley 2011). 
20 There is no clear consensus regarding how to define what constitutes implicit versus explicit 
processes, though some have suggested differences such as implicit versus explicit being related 
to associative versus rule–based learning, sensorimotor versus abstract representations, 
simplicity versus complexity or non–conscious versus conscious processes (Gómez et al. 2017). It 
has also been highlighted that the acquisition of language plays a key role in explicit cognitive 
processes (see Vygotsky 1978), but it is beyond the scope of this discussion to unpack these issues 
further. 




It is important to see that implicit and explicit processes differ in the manner 
in which they operate. Implicit processes are typically rapid and automatic, in 
comparison to slower, reflective explicit processes. While some have argued for 
distinct cognitive systems, such as in Kahneman’s “two–system” account 
(Kahnemann 2011), others have argued that implicit and explicit processes are 
instead aspects of a unitary system (Carruthers 2013; Mercier and Sperber 2017). 
Regardless, there is broad agreement that the different kinds of cognitive 
processes allow for flexible ways of dealing with different challenges that arise 
in complex environments. Furthermore, there is agreement that implicit 
cognitive processes are not in any sense replaced by explicit cognitive processes; 
explicit processes build on and supplement implicit processes. 
Theorists have also tried to understand the process of change between implicit 
and explicit cognitive processes. On Karmiloff–Smith’s “representational 
redescription” account (1992), learning involves the transformation of 
representations from implicit to explicit and vice versa. Being able to do so allows 
for great flexibility in learning, whether over the course of development or in skill 
learning in adults. For example, a violinist may have developed a technique that 
contains flaws on the implicit level. She will have acquired implicit–level 
knowledge of how to angle the bow or where to put her grip on the violin’s neck, 
knowledge which she cannot propositionally express. To unlearn this implicit 
technical flaw, it can be helpful to have a skilled teacher who can identify and 
articulate the issue in an explicit manner (e.g., “Try gripping higher up on the 
neck”). The reverse process is also important; it would be dangerous to learn to 
swim just by acquiring knowledge of facts about the bodily movements involved 
in swimming. One must also build up the requisite implicit forms of knowledge 
regarding how these movements are to be performed. 
Bringing these ideas together, we can see how the account of cognition that we 
have articulated understands a simple case that is provided by Smith, that of 
driving a car: 
 
Most of the day, we are simply involved in the world. We navigate our way and 
orient ourselves in the driveway unable to remember driving home. Our default 
mode of intending the world is noncognitive and pre reflective: it is an affective 
mode of “feeling our way around the world.” (2009, 50)  
 
On our account, driving a car involves a range of cognitive processes at both 
implicit and explicit levels. When driving home along familiar roads with 
predictable levels of traffic, one can rely on implicit cognitive processes. These 
are not solely affective, as they still involve processes of memory, inhibition, and 
prediction in the service of behavioral control. While driving a familiar route may 
be experienced in a non–conscious, “felt” sort of way, there are many cognitive 





processes that continue to occur to facilitate this activity. Furthermore, we can 
see how a range of cognitive processes are involved in learning to drive. One 
must develop the forms of implicit knowledge and memory that allow one to 
have a sense of the biting point of the clutch (assuming one is driving a real car, 
rather than an American car with automatic transmission) or how early to brake. 
But this will involve both explicit instruction in addition to the accrual of 
experience. In fact, following Karmiloff–Smith’s insights, we can see the situation 
of learning to drive as involving a complex integration of a range of implicit and 
explicit processes, with explicit knowledge being redescribed into implicit 
knowledge (e.g., being explicitly told the process of checking one’s mirror and 
signals, versus having an implicit grasp of when to do so) and vice versa 
(struggling with reversing and trying to explicitly articulate why one is 
struggling to do so). 
What this example also nicely highlights is the relation between explicit 
thought and communication. Implicit forms of knowledge or belief are difficult 
(if not impossible) to articulate, whereas explicit knowledge or beliefs can be 
shared, discussed, and debated. And as we highlight in the next section, there is 
a close relationship between explicit cognitive processes and social engagement. 
 
2.3 The Social Origins of Explicit Cognitive Processes 
 
Writing on the development of “higher cognitive functions”—what we are 
labelling explicit cognitive processes—the pioneering developmental 
psychologist Lev Vygotsky made a stark claim: 
 
Every function in the child’s cultural development appears twice: first, on the 
social level, and later, on the individual level; first, between people 
(interpsychological) and then inside the child (intrapsychological)… All the 
higher functions originate as actual relationships between individuals. 
(Vygotsky 1978, 57)  
 
Vygotsky’s claim was that to understand the developmental emergence of any 
explicit process, one must first examine the developmental precursors of that 
processes within social engagement. While Vygotsky’s approach has been 
refined and critiqued, recent research has vindicated many aspects of his 
approach to the development of explicit cognitive processes. It is now widely 
argued, from a range of theoretical standpoints, that explicit cognitive processes 
are both ontogenetically and phylogenetically dependent on social engagement 
(Heyes and Frith 2014; Hutto 2008; Mercier and Sperber 2011; O’Madagain and 
Tomasello 2019). 
 




Recent work in developmental psychology has provided evidence that explicit 
cognitive processes emerge out of early social experiences. Before explicit 
reasoning is used to solve abstract problems or make sophisticated future plans, 
it is used to interpret and understand the behavior of others in social contexts 
(O’Madagain and Tomasello 2019; Köymen and Tomasello 2020). Moll and 
Meltzoff (2011) present evidence that sophisticated understanding of others’ 
perspectives can be traced back to early shared engagements. In infancy, children 
engage in joint attention, the ability to attend to features of the world with others 
and understand that these features are shared with that other (Tomasello 1995). 
Through engaging in these shared experiences, children can begin to differentiate 
perspectives and thus understand that others have their own perspective on the 
world that is distinct from one’s own. This in turn allows children to understand 
that what another believes about the world might not only be different, but in 
competition with what they know about the world, an ability known as “false–
belief understanding” (Dennett 1978; Wimmer and Perner 1983). Research has 
supported the view that successful explicit understanding of others’ beliefs relies 
on the ability to manage conflicting perspectives on the world (Moll et al. 2013; 
Salter and Breheny 2019), combined with developing linguistic capabilities for 
talking about others’ minds (Astington and Jenkins 1999). By engaging in social 
interactions, children are introduced to the world of reasons and beliefs. They 
can then apply these abilities to plan and problem–solve in other domains, and 
to assess and update their own beliefs (O’Madagain and Tomasello 2019). 
Similarly, it has been argued that reasoning emerged phylogenetically as a 
result of the selection pressures of complex social living (Cummins 1996; Mercier 
and Sperber 2011).  While some have suggested that reasoning is adaptive as it 
helps with planning and dealing with novel challenges (Evans and Over 1996), it 
is not clear why such an issue cannot be overcome through learning and other 
forms of cognitive adaptation, as it is in other species. Clearly, reasoning can be 
useful in planning and dealing with novelty, but it does not follow that this is 
why it evolved. Mercier and Sperber (2011, 2017) argue that complex social 
groups create challenges such as determining trustworthiness and being able to 
convince others. Their “argumentative” account of reasoning explains humans’ 
tendency to favor information that supports already–held conclusions by 
proposing that this is a symptom of a system that has arisen to deal with social 
conflict, not abstract truth. Thus, “errors” such as confirmation bias (preferring 
information that fits with one’s pre–existing beliefs) are in fact features of a 
system that has evolved for argumentation. 
Overall, a developmental and evolutionary perspective on explicit cognitive 
processes views them as emerging as a result of human sociality. 
Developmentally, children are first introduced to explicit cognitive processes in 
the context of social engagements, as they start to think and talk about reasons 





and beliefs. Evolutionarily, explicit cognitive processes are hypothesized to have 
arisen primarily as a means of dealing with cooperation and conflict in social 
groups. From this perspective, humans’ sociality has a transformative effect on 
our psychology, both within development and across evolutionary history (Kern 
and Moll 2017). 
 
3. Liturgical Anthropology: A Psychologically Holistic Approach 
 
Where can these insights from psychological sciences take us in thinking about 
the relationship between liturgy and theological anthropology? Drawing the 
above discussion together, in this section we offer three insights we think can 
move us towards a constructive liturgical anthropology. Then, in the next section, 
we argue that these insights build towards an overarching conclusion that a 
liturgical anthropology requires a recognition of the centrality of humans’ social 
nature (Kern and Moll 2017; Tomasello 2019). Finally, we propose that these 
insights suggest that understanding the role of joint attention in liturgy is crucial 
for future work on liturgical formation and anthropology.  
First, it seems clear that affect and cognition are present from the very earliest 
stages of infant development. The attempt to artificially separate these categories 
simply does not reflect the way psychologists think human beings learn to 
navigate the world. A liturgical anthropology that takes this insight seriously will 
resist thinking of liturgy as shaping us as primarily cognitive creatures, or 
primarily affective creatures. Instead, it will affirm that, in all ritual behavior, 
cognitive and affective states are intertwined in ways difficult to disentangle. 
While there may be polemical value in opposing a dominant trend to think of 
worship and formation in only cognitive terms, overemphasizing the role of 
affect is equally detrimental, to the extent that it implies that one can be 
affectively transformed with only incidental effects on explicit cognitive 
processes, such as reasons or beliefs. On a holistic account, there is a dynamic 
interplay between (explicit) cognitive transformation and affective 
transformation, and liturgy involves psychologically holistic changes. 
Thus, it is clear that what we believe about God is shaped by the practices of 
liturgy in important ways. Take the example of the so–called “early high 
Christology” movement in New Testament studies. As Larry Hurtado (2010) has 
argued at length, understanding the practices of the early Church in worshipping 
Christ as God are key to understanding the doctrinal commitments of the early 
Church. As Hurtado puts it, “Jewish–Christians of the first few years of the 
Christian movement are pictured as practicing a religious devotion to Jesus that 
involves attributing to him powers and a status that is closely linked to God” 
(2010 43). Sidestepping the issue of whether Hurtado is right to affirm the early 
origins of Christological doctrine, it seems plausible to think that we need a 




liturgical anthropology that affirms both affect and cognition to make sense of 
claims like these. If we assume that worship requires some level of affect (i.e., of 
devotion or desire for God), we might ask the following: Did the early Christians 
worship Jesus because they believed he was divine? Or did they believe he was 
divine because they worshipped him? The insight offered from the psychological 
sciences suggests that these questions are not in conflict; the relationship between 
affect and cognition in this case is instead irreducibly complex. 
This point is also important for the use of liturgy with children. For if we 
assume either that liturgy is primarily a desire–shaping activity or primarily a 
belief–shaping activity, then we will not realize the formative power of liturgical 
action for the development of faith in children. In her discussion of childhood 
spirituality, Rebecca Nye argues that the “core” of children’s spirituality is what 
she calls “relational consciousness.” As she summarizes her studies: “children’s 
spirituality was recognized by a distinctive property of mental activity, profound 
and intricate enough to be termed ‘consciousness,’ and remarkable for its 
confinement to a broadly relational, inter– and intra–personal domain” (2006, 
109). As Nye goes on to clarify, what she means by “consciousness” is close to 
what psychologists have called “meta–cognition,” that is, the capacity to reflect 
on one’s own mental states (both cognitive and affective). In a revealing example, 
Nye writes,  
 
Six–year–old Ruth’s conversation included a sensual description of heaven. She 
referred to the key elements in her spiritual response as “waking up” and 
“noticing”, both of which suggest that a different quality of consciousness was 
crucial to her experience. The relational component in this was a strong feeling 
of connection to the natural world as something that was full of gifts for her and 
deserved her love and respect in return. This sense of intimacy also had 
reverberations in her relationship with herself, as seen in her self–conscious 
perception of a symmetry between her own joy and the joyful leaping of lambs. 
(2006, 110)  
 
Is Ruth’s religious understanding best understood as cognitive or affective? It 
seems to us that this is a question that we cannot answer easily. Indeed, in listing 
the different dimensions of religious consciousness, Nye includes both typically 
cognitive activities such as “reasoning” and “searching for meaning,” alongside 
typically affective activities such as “staying with a mood” and “stimulation” 
(2006, 114). In discussing these dimensions she notes, “it is unlikely that light will 
be shed on spirituality of a child by considering these dimensions in isolation” 
(2006, 113). Thus, in nurturing childhood spirituality, David Hay goes on to 
argue, we must use “rituals, stories, music, poetry, art and architecture…[which] 
articulate the inexpressible” (2006, 157). Citing Vygotsky (1978), Hay suggests 
that these mediums can help provide a “scaffolding of language,” in which 





children can “come to grips with their spirituality” (2006, 157). The 
developmental insights considered previously suggest that Nye and Hay are 
right to emphasize both the affective and cognitive dimensions of childhood 
spirituality. To understand how liturgy shapes children, we must avoid overly 
simplistic accounts of liturgical anthropology.  
Secondly, even if we artificially restrict our focus only to the cognitive effects 
of liturgy, the overall evidence suggests that cognition is not a monolithic 
category. It is more helpfully considered as involving a range of processes, 
involved both in fast, non–reflective processes and slow, deliberative processes. 
These processes are important and useful in their own right, as is the ability to 
transform our representations of the world between different formats. This 
ability is bidirectional; we can both come to articulate implicit knowledge in 
explicit ways, but also can come to understand explicit knowledge on an implicit 
level. Implicit thought is also not something that is left behind over the course of 
development; while implicit cognitive processes appear prior to explicit 
processes, this amounts more to an enriching of the available cognitive resources 
than the addition of cognition. On this approach, humans are not fundamentally 
non–thinkers who come to think; we are thinkers through and through, even 
though the kinds of thought processes we bring to bear differ depending on the 
activity at hand and the stage of our development. Furthermore, humans are not 
unique in our status as thinkers, even if our cognition is distinctive in its 
complexity (Laland and Seed 2021). 
Consider a recent account of liturgical epistemology from Nicholas 
Wolterstorff, which helps press the complexity of cognitive formation through 
liturgy. Wolterstorff argues that what is taken for granted about God in liturgy 
shapes the way we relate to God, even if we do not directly attend to the 
propositional content of a liturgical script. For instance, consider the American 
Episcopal liturgy, which Wolterstorff cites: 
 
Eternal God, heavenly Father, 
 you have graciously accepted us as living members 
 of your Son our Savior Jesus Christ, 
 and you have fed us with spiritual food 
and the Sacrament of his Body and Blood. (Wolterstorff 2015, 56) 
 
According to Wolterstorff, addressing God using these words allows participants 
to gain knowledge in virtue of the things we take for granted. Just as in taking 
for granted that the world existed before we were born, it is possible for us to 
know that the world existed before we were born, in taking for granted certain 
things about God through our use of liturgy, we can come to know that God is a 
certain way. Repetition of certain content shapes our understanding of who God 




is in ways that are not purely explicit. We can come to know, for example, that 
God is worthy of praise and adoration and that he capable of listening. 
Wolterstorff argues that, 
  
To participate in engaging God liturgically in the form of addressing God is to 
take God to be a ‘thou’ whom it is appropriate to address, to take God to be 
capable of listening, to take God to be worthy of praise and adoration, to take 
God to be capable of listening, to take God to be worthy of praise and adoration. 
(2016, 13) 
 
It is not that we solely come to know propositions about God in this way, for 
Wolterstorff. Rather, repeated exposure to these words, which we begin to take 
for granted gives us a kind of knowledge of God akin to phenomenal knowledge; 
we know what God is like by repeatedly engaging God in a certain way and not 
another. Just as repeated exposure to a biography might provide us with a thick 
non–propositional knowledge of the author, engagement with the liturgy can 
shape our perception of God, Wolterstorff thinks.21 The temptation is to think of 
Wolterstorff’s insight in purely explicitly cognitive terms; namely, that the kind 
of formation that occurs in taking for granted certain things about God is shaping 
our explicit beliefs about God. We think this is mistaken. For if the psychological 
insights above are correct, the process Wolterstorff describes involves shaping of 
both explicit and implicit beliefs. A child might implicitly believe “God listens to 
my prayers,” and only later in development be able to articulate explicit reasons 
for this belief. Or, following Nye (2006), explicit beliefs can serve as “scaffolding” 
that provides a framework that is later complemented by implicit beliefs and 
desires. We take this scaffolding to be the purpose of practices like catechesis.  
We do not see these routes to psychological change as competing; rather, 
liturgies can potentially create a positive “feedback loop” between explicit and 
implicit forms of knowledge; repeated exposure to forms of explicit knowledge 
about God can start to gradually shape our implicit beliefs, which in turn make 
us more likely to accept further explicit beliefs and make us more open to a 
greater range of affective experiences. Whatever one concludes about these 
issues, the terminology of implicit and explicit cognition provides a means of 
developing more nuanced accounts of liturgy and its formative effects. 
Thirdly, this body of work has built a compelling case from early ontogeny to 
adulthood that provides convincing evidence that explicit reasoning processes 
emerge out of the needs of negotiating complex social worlds, not primarily for 
discerning abstract logical truths. It is important to note that we are not claiming 
that humans cannot think in such abstract, logical ways. Rather, it is to argue that 
 
21 Sarah Coakley (2013) makes a very similar claim concerning how liturgy might provide 
perceptual, non–propositional knowledge of God over a long period of time.  





explicit cognitive processes have evolved and develop to deal with issues that 
arise in complex social groups; making sense of what others know and believe, 
discerning plausible reasons for others’ behavior, convincing others of one’s 
views and discerning others’ deception (Mercier and Sperber 2011; O’Madagain 
and Tomasello 2019). As such, those that hold to the primacy of belief formation 
are not only mistaken regarding humans as fundamentally homo cogitans but miss 
the fact that explicit cognitive processes are themselves a consequence of our 
social nature.  
Nye’s notion of “relational consciousness” in childhood spirituality helps 
show the theological import of the social origins of development. She writes,  
 
the child’s awareness of being in relationship with someone or something was 
demonstrated by what they said and, crucially, this was a special sense that 
added value to their ordinary and everyday perspective… In this “relational 
consciousness” seems to lie the rudimentary core of children’s spirituality, out of 
which can arise meaningful aesthetic experience, religious experience, personal 
and traditional responses to mystery and being, and mystical and moral insight. 
(2006, 109)  
 
Nye’s claim that relationality is at the core of children’s spirituality fits much 
more comfortably with the psychological literature we have been considering 
than the attempt to place either affect or cognition at the core of liturgical 
anthropology.  
Moreover, this emphasis on sociality or relationality as a fundamental quality 
to being human fits with a number of recent discussions in theological 
anthropology. For instance, in Susan Eastman’s recent book, Paul and the Person, 
she argues that there are some parallels between developmental psychological 
views on the nature of persons, and Paul’s anthropology in the New Testament. 
After summarizing the psychological discussion on the importance of 
relationality for human thought, she argues that something similar can be found 
in Paul’s thought:  
 
communion is the presupposition for a self that is capable of self–knowledge and 
action—and even for believers in Christ, such capacities are always limited under 
threat short of the final consummation. This is “relationism about persons” in 
which individuality presupposes relationality…‘There is no possibility of 
existence outside such other–relation. The determining factor in whether such 
other–relation is for good or for ill depends on the relational partner. Apart from 
Christ, humanity is so enslaved and deluded by sin that there is no individual at 
all; agency is, as it were, swallowed up by the powers of sin and death. But in 
Christ individuals become “partisans” in God’s liberating army, each living out 
a unique calling under God’s lordship. Such connection does not, however, entail 
an end to the vulnerability that goes with understanding the body as connection 




and communication. It may mean, rather, the capacity to endure and even 
flourish in the midst of affliction. (2017, 105) 
 
In congruence with developmental psychology, Eastman claims that, for Paul, 
the human self cannot be understood in isolation but only in relationship. Thus, 
she thinks, human beings are fundamentally relational beings, defined either in 
our relationship to sin, or, ideally in right relationship with Jesus Christ. 
According to a recent article by Simeon Zahl, even our individualistic 
soteriological language must be understood in its social context: “To feel guilt 
towards God and to experience it being resolved, or to feel gratitude toward God, 
is always a ‘social’ experience, cognitively speaking, in that such feelings depend 
upon a mental representation of God as an ‘other’ to whom the subject stands in 
a social relation” (2021, 15). As Zahl shows, existing tensions in theological 
anthropology and soteriology between “individualism” and “communalism” 
can be alleviated by engaging with psychological sciences. He argues that a 
psychologically–engaged anthropology will emphasise both the importance of 
the individual person and the relational nature of the person. As both Eastman 
and Zahl show, there is much in common between psychological sciences and 
theology on the issue of whether the human self is relational in nature. What 
remains to be seen is where the issue of liturgy comes into play.  
 
4. Liturgy, Development, and the Importance of Shared Attention 
 
We began our discussion with the claim that ritual behaviour plays a formative 
role in the development of human thinking and feeling. Throughout, we have 
considered examples in which liturgy and ritualized behavior shapes us. Having 
presented an account of human development as deeply social and 
psychologically holistic, we can now conclude by considering the place of liturgy 
as an important part of this development. In this section we argue that crucial to 
our understanding of how liturgy shapes us is understanding how liturgy is 
shared between persons. 
Drawing the psychological insights of the previous section together, our aim 
is to show that a developmental perspective has important consequences for 
theological anthropology. The approach we are advocating here is attempting to 
eliminate the tendency towards reductive or binary explanations that pit 
different kinds of processes (cognition, affect) against one another, rather than 
seeking to ascertain their role as part of an interdependent whole. This kind of 
“explanatory pluralism” is vital for progress in the study of the mind (Kendler 
2005; Lilienfeld 2007) and provides a fruitful direction for theological 
anthropologies. Furthermore, it recognizes the holistic manner in which humans 
are influenced by their capacity for shared intentionality (Kern and Moll 2017); 





all aspects of our cognition, affect, and action are influenced by our social nature. 
Adopting this strategy allows new, more fruitful sets of questions to arise. What 
role do “intellectual” (explicit cognitive processes) play in structuring liturgy? 
How do action and affect shape implicit and explicit beliefs? We have shown that 
these questions connect to important theological issues, and can now see the 
relevance of these insights to the importance of ritual and liturgical formation.   
In keeping with our approach, developmental psychology has found that 
infants’ do not employ their cognitive, affective, and sensorimotor capacities in 
isolation. Rather, the three are unified in the “narrative envelopes” of structured 
activities (Rochat, Querido and Striano 1999, 950). In other words, developmental 
psychology repeatedly attests to the importance of repetitive, structured 
activities (e.g. games, routines, liturgies) in the development of these interrelated 
capacities. Structured activities of various kinds provide a foundational structure 
of repeated, predictable experiences, but also provide a backdrop against which 
changes can take place (Fantasia et al. 2014; Rossmanith and Reddy 2016; Rogoff 
et al. 1995; Spagnola and Fiese 2007). The practices considered by developmental 
psychologists are overwhelmingly social, whether that be simple routines such 
as being picked up (Reddy, Markova, and Wallot 2013), shared games like peek–
a–boo (Rochat, Querido, and Striano 1999), singing songs with actions (Fantasia 
et al. 2014), or shared activities like reading a story (Rossmanith et al. 2014). Since 
these practices begin while the infant is unable to self–locomote and dependent 
on others for their basic needs, it is no surprise that the shared practices of infants’ 
lives are intrinsically social. However, social practices and activities continue to 
play a central role throughout early ontogeny, and indeed across the human 
lifespan (Legare and Nielsen 2020).22  
Moreover, the importance of regular, repeated routines can be observed in 
how infants engage in simple games like peekaboo. The peekaboo game is one 
that is played across a variety of different cultures, following the pattern of build–
up, climax, and resolution (Fernald and O’Neill 1993). It is an activity that is 
charged with positive affect, while also providing a means by which infants can 
 
22 In spite of their immaturity, young infants are still active participants in shared practices. 
Looking at the routine of picking up, Reddy and colleagues (2013) found infants as young as 2 
months are capable of adjusting their body to make it easier for their mother to pick them up, and 
mother and infants are able to co–facilitate increasingly smooth pick–ups from 2 to 4 months. 
They suggest that these adjustments indicate a grasp of being the target of another’s intentional 
action, a basic form of sociocognitive awareness. By around 5–months, infants are capable of 
raising their arms as a request to be picked up (see Carpendale and Carpendale 2010). This simple 
routine facilitates the infant’s sociocognitive grasp of being the target of another’s intentional 
action, charged with the positive affect involved in being reunited with one’s caregiver, as well 
as involving increasingly complex sensorimotor control which facilitates increasingly smoothly 
coordinated action. Furthermore, the infant’s role changes as their ability to communicate 
develops, going from solely co–regulator to potential initiator of the activity. 




form social expectations (Bigelow and Best 2013). The formation of social 
expectations relies on the activity being conducted in a repeated, regular format. 
Rochat and colleagues (1999) found that 4– and 6–month–old infants engaged 
more (through direct gaze and smiling) with an experimenter who performed a 
peek-a-boo activity in a repeated, organized manner (using a repeated, consistent 
ordering of speech and actions) rather than an irregular, disorganized manner. 
These responses were not found with 2–month–old infants, suggesting that the 
4– and 6–month–olds had formed expectations about how the game would 
proceed. As infants’ sensorimotor abilities develop and their manual control 
improves, they can begin to initiate games of peek–a–boo by covering their face 
with objects such as muslins. This allows them to build on the prior format to 
become initiators of the activity. Thus, the game of peek-a-boo is not solely an 
enjoyable game for infants, but serves as a foundation upon which new 
understanding can develop and new skills can be tried out and established. This 
interplay of imitation and innovation has been highlighted as a key driver of 
cultural development across the lifespan (Legare and Nielsen 2015). 
What makes humans capable of forming and participating in such structured 
activities? Psychologists and philosophers across a range of traditions have 
argued that it is the ability to engage in joint attention. Through joint attention, 
humans can establish “shared situations” (Barwise 1989) in which an experience 
of the world is felt to be perceived alongside others. By establishing such shared 
situations, humans can fluidly coordinate their attention, communicate, and act 
with others (Vessière 2016). Shared practices can thus be understood as involving 
the creation of a predictably structured shared situation, through which attention 
and activity are coordinated (Ramstead, Vessière and Kirmayer 2016). Thus, the 
ability to engage in joint attention enables shared practices to be developed, and 
in turn practices can be a means of shaping the joint attention of practitioners.23 
For example, through repeatedly engaging in shared book reading, a child 
becomes aware of the importance of attending to the words on the page, which 
are likely not to be the focus of attention prior to the more engaging images or 
textures that are present. 
 
23 As well as facilitating communication and coordinated action, joint attention has also been 
highlighted for its a crucial role in the transmission of cultural knowledge; the instrumental skills 
and social conventions of a community (see Legare and Nielsen 2015). When humans jointly 
attend with others, their attention is guided to particular features of the world, shaping how they 
subsequently act on and learn from the world (see Tomasello et al. 2005; Mundy and Newell 
2007). Shared practices, understood as attention–shaping practices, thus facilitate the acquisition 
of cultural knowledge by making certain features of the world more salient, and introducing 
practitioners to certain forms of activity. Over time, the shaping of attention and activity through 
joint engagements and shared practices enculturates infants into the community in which they 
are embedded, enabling them to become competent cultural participants.  
 





Viewing liturgy through the lens of joint attention is a promising line of 
investigation, and we have already attempted to integrate these topics (Cockayne 
and Salter 2019). Elsewhere, Joshua Cockayne and David Efird (2018) have 
argued that one reason liturgy is an importantly corporate activity is because 
jointly attending to a liturgical script (and perhaps also jointly attending to the 
presence of God) allows those gathered to shape and guide one another’s 
attention. If a structured and social game like peek–a–boo can direct the attention 
of a young child, developing both their cognition and affect as well as their 
sensorimotor abilities, then it doesn’t seem far–fetched to think that religiously 
significant rituals (i.e., liturgies) such as the Eucharist, can be thought of in these 
developmental terms. One of the common features of the Eucharist and a game 
of peek–a–boo is that both practices involve a shaping of attention in a social 
context. How the practices are carried out (i.e., how often, who is present, who is 
allowed to participate) will shape the experience of the participants in important 
ways.  
Human beings are ritualized creatures, who are shaped by participation in 
various practices and liturgies. We are now in a position to see the psychological 
and theological significance of the observation, which we began by noting. It 
seems clear to us, that Smith is right to push back against an overly cognitive 
understanding of this claim: namely, rituals shape us because we are rational, 
thinking creatures who are influenced by our exposure to the propositional 
content of liturgy. However, it should be clear now why the alternative presented 
by Smith is false. Smith’s explanation runs something like the following: rituals 
shape us because we are affective, desiring creatures who are influenced by the 
telos of rituals. Here is the view we have been developing in a nutshell: rituals 
shape us because we are social creatures, whose minds and bodies are shaped 
through engagement with others. Rituals are fundamentally shared activities 
which allow us to jointly attend to an object with others, thereby allowing our 
fellow participants to direct our own focus of attention. In jointly attending the 
world with others, and in jointly attending to God in the context of liturgy, our 




In summary, practices and rituals play a crucial role in development, requiring 
holistic psychological and social engagement. As we have now seen, one of the 
crucial reasons this is the case is that practices and rituals make possible the 
sharing of attention. The significance of this for thinking about liturgical 
anthropology promises to shed important light on our understanding of what it 
is we do when we engage in liturgies in the context of corporate worship. Unlike 
Smith’s account, which suggests that liturgies themselves are inherently 




teleological, we think liturgies are inherently shared. It is in virtue of their shared 
nature—the way they facilitate the sharing of attention and the social scaffolding 
they provide—that liturgies have a telos. We are shaped by liturgy because 
liturgy allows us to engage with others, in ways that go beyond the isolated 
forming of beliefs and desires.  
This insight provides important questions for thinking about liturgy and 
anthropology in future work, we think: How can an immaterial object, such as 
God, be an object of joint attention? How might our beliefs and feelings about 
God be shaped by attending to God alongside others in worship? How do 
environmental features (e.g. architecture, layout, furniture) effect the ways in 
which our attention is directed in liturgy? And what are the limits of such 
sharedness: Can infants and adults participate in attention shaping liturgies in 
the same way? Does this sense of sharedness extend beyond those physically co–
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